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DEMOCRATIZING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:  WHAT DO 
COUNTRIES LEGISLATE? 
 
Jeanne Kinney Giraldo 
 
After a transition away from authoritarianism, one of the central challenges facing 
new democratic elites is redefining civil-military relations.  Among other things, this 
means writing or revising constitutions and laws that regulate the roles, rights, and 
obligations of the military so that they conform to the basic democratic principles of 
accountability to democratically elected leaders and respect for civil liberties.1  Under the 
preceding non-democratic regimes, militaries were often accustomed to acting in ways 
that violated these principles, by operating autonomously within the defense arena, 
playing an important role in non-defense areas, and participating in regime violations of 
human rights.2  Although writing new laws designed to modify this behavior will not 
automatically lead to a change, it is a necessary first step.   
 
This paper identifies some of the most important areas of legislation that need 
reform during a transition to democracy in order to establish the authority of civilian 
                                                
1 This paper addresses all legal measures that govern civil-military relations, ranging from articles of the 
constitution to presidential and ministerial decrees.  The permanency of such measures varies from country 
to country, but in general constitutional provisions have the most staying power since they usually require 
an unusual majority for amendment.  Organic laws or constitutive laws describe how organs of the state 
will be constituted and have a semi-constitutional character, frequently requiring a larger majority for 
reform than ordinary legislation but a lower quorum than constitutional reform.  All constitutions, even 
those as detailed as the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, require enabling legislation that provides the detail 
necessary for general constitutional principles to assume the force of law.  Ministerial or presidential 
decrees are usually easily reversed by the next government.   
2 This draws on the definition of civilian supremacy offered by Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and 
Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), p. 19.  Since Agüero’s definition of civilian supremacy can apply to non-
democratic as well as democratic regimes, it does not include an explicit reference to respect for civil 
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leaders in defense areas, reduce the role of the military outside the defense area, and 
guarantee civil liberties.3  The first section examines constitutional provisions that 
establish the principle of civilian supremacy over the military.  In addition to asserting 
this principle in the constitution, legislation should contain provisions for the 
subordination of the military to the three branches of government – the executive, the 
legislature, and the judiciary.  The second section discusses military subordination to the 
executive branch of government via a chain of command that names the head of state or 
government as the head of the military and a Ministry of Defense (MOD) that converts 
this legal authority into practical authority.   The third section highlights laws that 
delineate military subordination to the judicial branch and the rule of law in carrying out 
its mission.4  The second half of the paper addresses legislation designed to reduce and 
regulate the involvement of the military in non-defense areas.  The fourth section 
discusses rules governing the political activities of military personnel and the institution 
as a whole.  The fifth section summarizes the debate over the use of the military in 
internal roles, such as civic action and internal security.  It discusses the legislation 
necessary to guarantee civilian authority over such missions and the protection of civil 
liberties.  Finally, the reduction of the military’s role in internal security requires the 
demilitarization of police forces and intelligence agencies; legislation geared toward this 
                                                                                                                                            
liberties.  However, one of the features that sets democratic civilian supremacy apart from its non-
democratic counterpart is respect for civil liberties, hence its inclusion in this paper. 
3 The paper is based on an examination of the experiences of democratizing countries representing a broad, 
geographical cross-section: Brazil, Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, 
South Africa, South Korea, and Spain. Each country has been through a transition to democracy, which 
entailed a debate over the appropriate roles and missions of the armed forces and numerous attempts to 
assert democratic civilian control over the military.   The countries chosen provide variation with respect to 
levels of economic development, regime type (presidential or parliamentary), levels of external and internal 
threat facing the government and, most importantly, the degree to which they have crafted constitutional 
and legal frameworks that reflect the principles of democratic civilian control of the military. 
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end is highlighted in the sixth section.   Although many governments may not be able to 
carry out all these reforms immediately following the transition to democracy, their 
eventual inclusion on the agenda is necessary for democratic consolidation. 
 
1.  The Principle of Civilian Supremacy 
In a democracy, elected officials are the only ones who can claim to represent the 
national interest or the will of the people.  In order to govern, these officials delegate 
responsibilities to different organs of the state, such as the military or the ministry of 
health, which are then held accountable to the elected officials for their actions.   The 
constitution should reflect this and not accord the military a privileged position, distinct 
from that of other state institutions.  The military should not be granted any special status 
that puts it on a par with, or above, the duly constituted branches of government – the 
executive, legislature and judiciary.  Democratic constitutions in the past often granted 
the military such status and this was frequently used as a justification for military 
involvement in politics.5    
 
Recognition of the principle of civilian supremacy is sometimes made explicitly 
in constitutions, as is the case in the Philippines.6  In other cases, civilian supremacy is 
acknowledged implicitly, simply by not granting the military any special status and by 
                                                                                                                                            
4 The authority of the legislature over the military is discussed in Jeanne K. Giraldo, “Legislative Control of 
the Military: The Comparative Experience,” Center for Civil-Military Relations, Occasional Paper # 8, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2001. 
5 See Brian Loveman, “‘Protected Democracy’ in Latin America,” in John P. Lovell and David E. Albright, 
eds., To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1997).   
6 “Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the 
protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of 
the national territory” [Constitution of the Philippines, Article II, Section 30]. 
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discussing the armed forces only in the section of the Constitution on organs of the 
government.7  The explicit recognition of civilian authority provides the surest legal 
safeguard, since standard constitutional references to the military as protector of the 
“people,” the “state,” or the “nation” can be (and often are) interpreted by the military as 
a mandate to interpret the will of the people or the nation on their own.  
 
In some countries, the constitution assigns the military a more ambiguous role of 
“defending the Constitution” (for instance, in Brazil and Chile) or preventing the 
president from seeking re-election or staying in power (as is the case in El Salvador and 
Guatemala).8  The role of “defending the Constitution” can be interpreted in many benign 
ways – as the duty to defend the Constitution from external threats or as an injunction 
against actions contrary to the democratic system.  However, it is also frequently 
understood by the military as a duty to interpret the Constitution and act autonomously to 
veto what it judges to be unconstitutional policies or objectionable constitutional reforms.  
In effect, the military becomes a fourth branch of government, checking and balancing 
the power of the other branches rather than being accountable to them. 
 
2.  Military Subordination to the Executive Branch   
Almost universally, democratic constitutions implement the principle of civilian 
supremacy by naming the head of state or government – whether this be the president, 
prime minister, or constitutional monarch (as in the case of Spain) – as the commander-
                                                
7 In the Spanish case, the mention of the military in the preamble to the 1978 Constitution set the armed 
forces apart from other state agencies and was interpreted as a sign of its special status.  Military hardliners 
would later use this to justify their challenge of civilian efforts to assert control over the military.  See 
Agüero, p.  152. 
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in-chief of the armed forces.  While this is a necessary condition for asserting civilian 
control over the military, it is insufficient.  The head of state generally does not have the 
time or the expertise to direct personally the formulation and implementation of defense 
policy.  As a result, he or she will delegate responsibility to a minister of defense who, 
advised by a ministry staffed with both civilian and military experts, will oversee defense 
and military policy.9 
 
Civilian supremacy over the military is enhanced by stripping service commanders of 
the cabinet rank they often enjoyed under authoritarian regimes and putting them under 
the control of a civilian minister of defense.  This was done in Spain soon after the 
transition to democracy and in 1999 in Brazil, 14 years after its transition.10  In Russia, 
service commanders were removed from the cabinet but the minister of defense remains a 
military officer.  In Indonesia, in contrast, the head of the armed forces is a peer of the 
minister of defense in the cabinet and thus participates in political decision-making.  
 
A number of additional reforms are usually necessary to strengthen the role of 
civilians in general, and the civilian defense minister in particular, in the making of 
policy.  First, collective bodies with strong military representation should be relegated to 
advisory roles with reduced command or policy authority (as occurred with the Joint 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Loveman, p. 139.  This paragraph draws on his discussion. 
9 The authority of the defense minister thus derives from that of the president or prime minister as 
commander-in-chief; the two are not mutually exclusive.  Under these circumstances, it makes little sense 
to argue that the military should report only to the president (as commander-in-chief) and not the minister 
of defense.  (An argument the Indonesian military, for example, has made in their effort to resist civilian 
control.)  For more on the need for civilian Ministries of Defense, see Thomas C. Bruneau, “Ministries of 
Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Center for Civil-Military Relations, Occasional Paper # 
13, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2001. 
 10 
Chiefs and the National Defense Board in the 1984 reform of Spain’s Organic Law on 
National Defense).11   Second, within the ministry, the responsibilities accorded to 
civilians should be specifically defined or else it is likely that many tasks will fall by 
default to the military.  The division of labor between military and civilian personnel 
within the ministry on policy, administrative, and professional functions varies within 
democratic regimes, but it is generally agreed that the more civilians are in the top policy-
making posts, the more effective civilian control is likely to be.   
 
Finally, civilian control is likely to be more effective if civilian power is concentrated 
and there is a single unambiguous chain of command, so that the military cannot pit 
civilians within the executive branch against one another.   However, advanced 
democracies differ in the extent to which they are organized in such a fashion.  Germany 
forestalls any attempts to bypass the minister of defense with direct appeals to the prime 
minister (Federal Chancellor) by naming the Minister as commander-in-chief during 
peacetime. (During times of emergency, the Federal Chancellor assumes command.)   In 
Britain, in contrast, service chiefs have the right of direct access to the prime minister.  In 
France and many new East European democracies, the hybrid nature of the executive – 
consisting of both a prime minister and a president who share authority over the armed 
forces – creates a confused chain of command.  In Spain, in contrast, a 1984 
reorganization of the chain of command clarified confusions about the responsibilities of 
the king (as commander-in-chief), the prime minister, and minister of defense in the 
making of defense policy.  It specified that the government and not the king play the 
                                                                                                                                            
10 In Spain, the Ministry of Defense was created in July 1977 and service chiefs demoted, but a civilian 
minister of defense was not named until April 1979. 
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leading role in defense policy and explicitly delegated many of the prerogatives of the 
prime minister to the minister.12   
 
3.  Military Subordination to the Judicial Branch 
The rule of law is a fundamental aspect of any democracy, and the military must 
not be exempt from obedience to the civil code and judgment in civilian courts.  In a 
democracy, civilian courts should have broad jurisdiction over all criminal acts 
committed by military personnel, including common crimes, violations of civil liberties 
committed in the course of carrying out internal security tasks, and political crimes like 
military rebellions against the democratically-constituted authorities.  The military cannot 
be above the law, and this is best guaranteed by trial in civilian courts, which are often 
more likely than military courts to find military transgressors guilty. Civilian courts have 
jurisdiction over military personnel in Germany, Spain, and even Guatemala (after a 1996 
law limited military jurisdiction to violations of military regulations).  In Brazil, in 
contrast, military courts have jurisdiction over federal military personnel and the state 
military police, which is responsible for domestic law enforcement at the state level.13   
Repeated efforts to place the state military police under civilian courts have failed. After 
19 members of the Landless Movement were massacred by state police forces at 
Eldorado dos Carajas in 1996, however, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso managed 
to shepherd through Congress minor changes to the jurisdiction of military courts.   
Premeditated crimes committed by members of the state military police (but not the 
                                                                                                                                            
11 Agüero, p. 189. 
12 Ibid., pp. 188-197. 
13 The state military police is an army reserve that came to perform street-patrolling functions under the 
authoritarian regime, supplanting the role of the state civilian police.   
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federal military) involving loss of civilian life would be tried in civilian courts (although 
they would still be investigated by the military).14 
 
For civilian courts to have jurisdiction over military violations of human rights, 
legislation must be passed that restricts a soldier’s ability to argue that he was simply 
following orders as a defense for illegal actions.   For example, a 1985 reform of the 
Military Penal Code in Spain put limits on the “due obedience” defense, while the South 
African Constitution eliminated such a defense completely by obligating soldiers to 
disobey orders that contravene the Constitution or international humanitarian law.  In 
Guatemala, in contrast, the Constitution exempts soldiers from following unlawful orders 
but it does not obligate disobedience, thus leaving room for a defense of “due obedience.” 
 
Conversely, military courts should have very little jurisdiction in a democracy 
over civilians.  In particular, they should not try civilians for violations of national 
security or anti-terrorist laws during peacetime.15  In keeping with this, the 1985 
Guatemalan Constitution and the 1978 Spanish Constitution prohibit military jurisdiction 
over civilians and the 1988 Brazilian Constitution eliminated military jurisdiction over 
political crimes.  However, these cases illustrate the important point that constitutional 
provisions have no impact until they are given life by enabling legislation.  In Spain, for 
example, it was not until 1980 – after two leading journalists were court-martialed and a 
film critical of the Guardia Civil was seized by the military – that parliament enacted the 
                                                
14 Jorge Zaverucha, “The 1988 Brazilian Constitution and its Authoritarian Legacy: Formalizing 
Democracy While Gutting its Essence,”  Journal of Third World Studies, 15:1 (Spring 1998), p. 114. 
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additional legislation necessary to make the constitutional provision a reality.  Similarly, 
the Brazilian Constitution transferred jurisdiction over political crimes from military to 
civilian courts, but because civilian courts have no jurisprudence for such crimes, cases 
end up being remanded to military courts.16   
 
In cases of extreme unrest, it is sometimes considered legitimate for the executive, 
usually in cooperation with the legislature, to delegate authority to military courts by 
declaring a state of siege or martial law.  This often permits military courts to prosecute 
civilians charged with otherwise legal activities like strikes and demonstrations.  
However, the frequency with which states of siege are invoked in some developing 
countries calls into serious question the existence of due process if military courts are 
granted extensive jurisdiction under such circumstances.  Civilian legislators should 
consider their country’s particular circumstances, in particular the executive’s propensity 
to rely on states of emergency to govern, when deciding on military jurisdiction during 
such times. 
 
In sum, the primary task of military courts should be limited to enforcing a 
Military Code of Justice (MCJ), which is designed to ensure the discipline necessary for 
the military’s effective performance of its mission.  To this end, the MCJ should only 
criminalize offenses against military discipline, such as abandoning one’s post.17   In a 
                                                                                                                                            
15 The range of crimes covered by national security and anti-terrorist laws was frequently widened under 
authoritarian rule.  As a result, these laws usually need to be (but often are not) revised to make them 
compatible with democracy.   For a discussion, see Loveman. 
16 Jorge Zaverucha, “Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil,” Latin American 
Perspectives, 27:3 (May 2000), p. 21. 
17 No other crime should be considered a military crime, lest military jurisdiction expand unduly.  In Brazil, 
for example, any crime committed with a weapon belonging to a member of the armed forces is considered 
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democracy, this need for military discipline must be balanced against a concern not to 
infringe excessively on the basic civil rights of soldiers.  For this reason, the MCJ in 
many countries includes safeguards that provide military personnel with due process.  In 
addition, many countries limit military jurisdiction by permitting soldiers the right to 
appeal military court decisions in civilian courts.  In the United States, due process 
guarantees were introduced after the Second World War, when returning veterans (of 
whom 1 out of every 8 had been subject to court martial) demanded greater protections 
against summary justice meted out by superior officers.18   Similarly, the 1985 Military 
Penal Code in Spain introduced safeguards comparable to those of the civil criminal 
system and permitted decisions made in military courts to be appealed to the civil 
Supreme Court.  In Germany, the Military Code of Justice restricts the disciplinary power 
of officers and guarantees the right to appeal.  (In addition, an Independent Office of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner is charged with monitoring the military’s treatment of its 
soldiers and has broad powers to investigate wrongdoings.)  
 
4.  Political Activities of the Military  
In an effort to forestall military involvement in politics, many democratic 
constitutions and laws expressly forbid the military as an institution from playing a 
political role.  For example, the Mozambican National Defense Law describes the 
character of the armed forces as “non-partisan,” the Philippine Constitution notes that the 
military “shall be insulated from partisan politics,” and one of the most strongly contested 
                                                                                                                                            
a military crime. This means almost all crimes committed by military personnel are judged in military 
courts. 
18 Nearly 2 of the 16 million who served were subject to court martial.  See John S. Cooke, “Military justice 
and the uniform code of military justice,” The Army Lawyer (Charlottesville, VA: March 2000). 
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provisions of the 1987 South Korean Constitution asserts that the “political neutrality [of 
the armed forces] shall be observed.”19  These provisions are important in preventing the 
kind of military involvement in partisan politics that often characterized non-democratic 
regimes or undermined previous experiments with democracy.   However, the terms lend 
themselves to being too narrowly construed as foreclosing military participation in 
partisan activities and debates, but permitting more general comments on government 
policy or participation in policy making.  The 1985 Constitution in Guatemala casts a 
wider net in prohibiting military consideration of political matters by designating the 
institution as “professional, apolitical, obedient and non-deliberative.”20  
 
Interestingly, while the military as an institution is prohibited from playing a 
political role in most democracies, the military officers are often not explicitly prohibited 
from holding cabinet positions.21  Despite the lack of legal prohibitions, civilian elites in 
newly democratizing countries often view the exclusion of the military from the cabinet 
as one of the first tasks necessary for asserting civilian control.  The number of military 
personnel in the cabinet generally declines over time as the military is phased out as a 
                                                
19 The South Korean military argued for the phrase, “political neutrality shall be observed,” whereas 
democratic reformers preferred the stronger “political neutrality must be observed.” [Michael G. Burton 
and Jai P. Ryu, “South Korea’s Elite Settlement and Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Political and 
Military Sociology 25:1 (Summer 1997), p. 11.]  This example illustrates the maxim that, at least in matters 
of constitutional reform and legislation, “the devil is in the details.” 
20 In the Chilean case, a “non-deliberative” clause has been effective in placing some limits on participation 
in the public debate of a military that otherwise has an expansive view of its role and prerogatives.  
21 The 1987 Constitution in South Korea, written during the transition to democracy, is an exception.  It 
retained a clause from the 1980 authoritarian constitution prohibiting active duty military from holding a 
cabinet post.   The Guatemalan Constitution of 1985 is exceptional for a different reason:  it requires the 
minister of defense to be an officer.  A recent effort to circumvent this provision through presidential 
decree has been declared unconstitutional.  
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political actor and as civilians establish the principle of civilian supremacy in the defense 
area.22   
 
While countries often find it unnecessary to have laws governing cabinet 
appointments (which are at the discretion of the executive), most countries have detailed 
provisions regulating the right of individual soldiers to hold public office, organize 
politically, and vote.  In deciding on these regulations, democracies are faced with the 
challenge of balancing the individual soldier’s right as a citizen to participate in politics 
and the overriding need to prevent such involvement by the military as an institution.   
Typically, the more public and sustained the political activity is (e.g., holding office), the 
more likely the involvement of military personnel is to be prohibited or highly regulated.  
The more private (and limited) political act of voting is least regulated, although this was 
not always the case.   
 
Many democracies prohibit active-duty personnel from running for and holding 
legislative office.  In Israel and Spain, for example, individuals who are on active duty or 
who expect to return to the military in the future are not allowed to serve in the 
legislature.  Some countries limit participation in politics according to categories of 
military personnel and areas of politics.  In the United States, for example, reservists but 
not active duty personnel are allowed to serve in the legislature.  In Brazil, military 
personnel with more than ten years in the service must retire in order to hold office, but 
those with less than ten years are allowed to take leave in order to hold office.  In 
                                                
22 In some cases, military participation is not limited to the national-level cabinet.  In Indonesia, for 
example, the ongoing political role of the military is evidenced in the continuing presence of military at the 
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Germany, soldiers may serve in local legislative offices while still on active duty, but 
must take unpaid leave for the duration of their elected term of office at the national 
level.  In other cases, there are few restrictions.  Russian military personnel have 
campaigned successfully for local and national-level elected offices since 1989.   
 
Almost universally in democracies, parties and movements are banned from 
carrying out activities in military barracks, where there is a captive audience and such 
behavior could be interpreted as official endorsement of partisan, political views.  There 
is more variation within democracies on whether soldiers are allowed to participate in 
political groupings or parties.  In many advanced democracies (e.g., Germany, the United 
States), soldiers are allowed to belong to political parties (and express their political 
views publicly) as long as it is clear that they are not acting as representatives of the 
armed forces.23  In countries where the distinction between the involvement of the 
“individual as private citizen” in partisan politics and the “individual as officer” has been 
harder to maintain, outright prohibitions on partisan politics can be found.   For example, 
members of the Spanish armed forces are not allowed to express their political views 
publicly or to collaborate in any way with political parties.  Soldiers in the Philippines are 
not permitted to engage in partisan political activity. 
 
Finally, most advanced democracies permit soldiers to vote since this is has come 
to be seen as one of the most fundamental political rights, and its secret nature reduces 
the risk that casting a vote will implicate the military as an institution in politics.  In the 
                                                                                                                                            
cabinet level in provincial, regency-level, and local governments. 
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past, particularly in developing countries where politicization of the military was an 
issue, soldiers were denied the vote out of the fear that military commanders could 
become important political actors by controlling the votes of their personnel or that 
soldier-citizens would be subject to the same politicization and divisions as voters in the 
broader society. With the spread of universal suffrage, however, restrictions on the 
military vote have become less tenable.  Of the newer democracies addressed in this 
study, only Guatemala and Indonesia deny voting rights to military personnel.24  In most 
countries, concerns about politicization are addressed through restrictions on partisan 
activities in the barracks rather than through limits on the right to vote.25    
 
5.  Military Roles and Missions 
In a democracy, elected officials must decide whether the military’s role should 
be limited to defending the country from external threats or expanded to promoting 
internal security and carrying out civic action programs (e.g., providing health and 
education services, building infrastructure).   In addition to defining the military role, 
democratic authorities must structure a clear legal framework regulating military 
involvement in, and civilian supervision of, the specific missions that arise from these 
roles.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
23 There is one important exception: US military personnel are prohibited from showing disrespect in public 
for the president.   
24 In Brazil, conscripts are not allowed to register to vote during their period of compulsory service.  
25 These restrictions have not always been effective.  In Russia, presidential decrees banning parties and 
movements from the armed forces are routinely ignored.  As a result, it is believed by Russian politicians 
and analysts alike that military commanders can influence the votes of their subordinates.  See Marybeth 
Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999),  p. 143. 
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Under authoritarian rule, militaries frequently play extensive internal security and 
civic action roles and many enjoy a great deal of autonomy from civilian authority in 
carrying out their missions.  Most authoritarian regimes during the Cold War era did not 
distinguish clearly between external and internal threats to security.  Instead, they often 
conflated the two, defining groups of citizens as enemies against whom war should be 
waged, and justifying the use of the military in policing, counterintelligence, and civic 
action.26  In many southern European, Latin American, and South Asian countries, police 
were often under the control of the ministry of defense, police officers were seconded 
from the armed forces, and police units were commanded by active-duty military officers.  
In other cases where the police apparatus of the state was strong, the military role in 
internal control was reduced but nonetheless significant.27  Everywhere, military 
intelligence agents were involved in collecting information on their fellow citizens.  
Military-run civic action programs provided health and education services and 
infrastructure in poor, rural areas that were considered fertile terrain for insurgent 
movements.  Frequently the administrative presence of the military in these areas doubled 
as an intelligence service, monitoring the civilian population.  In most countries, this 
expanded role for the armed forces led to widespread human rights violations and 
extensive involvement of the military in politics. 
 
                                                
26 Much has been written about the national security doctrine of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, but 
the notion is not limited to the Western Hemisphere.  The civil war in Mozambique, in which insurgents 
had the backing of neighboring regimes, gave rise to a similar conception.  Similarly, the threat from North 
Korea encouraged such interpretations in the South.  In Leninist states, counterintelligence and foreign 
intelligence were combined in single organizations in part because the states “made little distinction 
between external and domestic political threats, claiming that the latter were always foreign inspired.” 
[Russia: A Country Study, Chapter 10, subsection on “Internal Security Before 1991,” Library of Congress.  
Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html.]  
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In response to this experience, a number of new democracies have chosen to 
identify the military’s primary role as external defense.  The Spanish Constitution, for 
example, eliminated the historical reference to the military’s role in maintaining “national 
security” and the 1996 peace accords in Guatemala called for eliminating reference in the 
1985 Constitution to the military’s role in maintaining “internal peace and security.”  
(However, a May 1999 referendum on constitutional reforms, including this one, failed.)   
In Brazil, while the 1988 Constitution maintains a role for the military in keeping “law 
and order upon the request of any of the three branches of government,” supplemental 
legislation passed in 1991 limited the military to a support role.  Civilians would be 
permitted to call on the military only after police forces have tried and failed to keep 
order.28   In short, many new democracies have arrived at the same conclusion:  that the 
military should not be the constitutionally-mandated first line of defense in internal 
security or civic action.  A civilianized police force and civilian ministries of the state 
(e.g., health, education, public works) should bear the primary responsibility for 
maintaining order and providing services to the population.29   
 
Despite the potentially negative implications of an internal role for the military, 
the reality of weak civilian institutions unable to deal with escalating rates of crime and 
increasing poverty make it unlikely that civilians will restrain from using the military in 
                                                                                                                                            
27 For example, there was a clear separation between the police and the military in the South African 
apartheid regime, but the military was involved in internal policing roles, nonetheless. 
28 In practice, this clause has been violated repeatedly.   See Zaverucha, 2000, pp. 16-17.  
29Louis Goodman has outlined valuable criteria to guide civilians in deciding whether the military should 
be used in an internal mission.  The military should only be used if national well-being depends on the task 
being carried out and no civilian institution is capable of carrying it out.  In addition, civilians should 
consider how the mission affects the military’s involvement in domestic politics and its core combat 
mission.   See Goodman, “Post-Cold War Military Missions,” in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., 
Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
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internal missions.  In many countries, understaffed, technically incompetent, corrupt, 
undisciplined, and poorly trained police forces are incapable of providing riot and strike 
control, standing up to insurgents, fighting narcotraffickers, or dealing with high crime 
rates that are often fueled by the availability of weapons and the persistence of a culture 
of violence in post-conflict scenarios (e.g., Guatemala, Mozambique, South Africa).  In 
some countries, the military is the only national institution with a presence in all parts of 
the national territory and the capacity to deliver state services.   Politically, there is 
frequently a great deal of support for the military to play a role in civic action in countries 
with high levels of poverty and to use the military in a policing role.  Under some 
circumstances, the military might also favor such roles in order to garner resources and 
recuperate public faith in the institution. 
 
Given the likelihood of some military involvement in internal missions, new 
democracies cannot be satisfied with simply identifying external defense as the military’s 
primary mission.  This would leave the door open for the use of the military on a 
completely ad hoc and unregulated basis, circumventing civilian control.   Instead, 
legislation must be passed that (1) guarantees civilian control over the military’s internal 
missions; (2) reduces the degree of military encroachment on the roles of other civilian 
institutions; and (3) minimizes the risks of human rights violations.  Civilians, and not the 
military, should decide when and how the armed forces will be used, specifying what can 
and cannot be done, the time frame to begin and cease action, and the allocation of 
responsibility among civilians and officers in command and control of the mission.  The 
military should be limited to a support role.  They should only be called in after the police 
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have failed and they should not be granted police powers of search and seizure or 
detention and arrest.   Military support operations should be subject to review by the 
legislature and courts.30   
 
The 1996 peace accords that ended the internal conflict in Guatemala provide a 
good example of the principles that should govern military participation in internal 
missions: 
 
When the ordinary means for the maintenance of public order and 
domestic peace are exhausted, the President of the Republic may 
exceptionally use the armed forces for this purpose.  The deployment of 
the armed forces shall always be temporary, shall be conducted under 
civilian authority and shall not involve any limitation on the exercise of 
the constitutional rights of citizens….  The operations of the armed forces 
shall be limited to the times and modalities which are strictly necessary, 
and shall end as soon as the purpose has been achieved.  The President of 
the Republic shall keep Congress informed about the operations of the 
armed forces, and Congress may at any time decide that such operations 
should cease.  At all events, within 15 days of the end of such operation, 
                                                
30 For a discussion of the difficulties that emerge when the military is employed in domestic law 
enforcement, see María José Moyano Rasmussen, “The Military Role in Internal Defense and Security:  
Some Problems,”  The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Occasional Paper #6, Monterey, California, 
October 1999. 
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the President of the Republic shall submit to Congress a detailed report on 
the operation of the armed forces.31 
 
Similarly, Article 87a of the German Constitution stipulates that the military only be used 
at the initiation of civilian authorities and only when the police are incapable of 
defending democracy from armed insurgents.  The military must cooperate with the 
competent authorities and Parliament can put an end to the use of the military. 
 
In Brazil, in contrast, there is little legislative or judiciary oversight of either the 
President’s initial decision to call out the armed forces or of the subsequent operations.32   
As importantly, the rules governing military operations are unclear, leading to disputes 
over command authority and a lack of executive control over the operations.  In a 1995 
sweep of the crime-ridden favelas outside of Rio de Janeiro, the state governor was not 
involved in decisions about the operation, other than the initial decision to use the armed 
forces.  Command authority was disputed between the military and the secretary of public 
safety for the state (a reserve general), but the ambiguous legislation in this area made it 
impossible for even the Minister of Justice to resolve the conflict.33 
 
                                                
31 Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic 
Society, signed September 19, 1996.  Available at the United States Institute for Peace’s Digital Documents 
page: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/guat_960919.html. 
32 The 1988 Constitution originally called for the armed forces to play a role in maintaining law and order, 
at the request of any of the three branches of government.  This led to the unusual situation of a judge 
calling out the military to repress a November 1988 steel strike in Volta Redonda, resulting in the death of 
three workers.  In response, Congress passed Supplementary Law 69 on July 23, 1991, which gave only the 
executive the right to call out the Armed Forces.  The presidents of the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, 
and the Supreme Court may also ask for military intervention, but the request must pass through the 
president, who has the right to veto it.   See Zaverucha, 1998, pp. 111-112. 
33 Zaverucha, 2000, p. 16. 
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6.  Demilitarizing Public Security and Intelligence 
In order to ensure that the military’s role in internal missions remains temporary, 
the government must work to strengthen the civilian ministries and agencies that have the 
primary responsibility for providing services and maintaining order.  In the case of 
institutions charged with internal security, this means strengthening and civilianizing the 
police force and creating civilian intelligence agencies that are accountable to the 
executive and legislative branches.  In countries where the police is under the control of 
the military, legislation must be written to shift this control to local officials or a non-
military ministry, such as the Ministry of Interior, and to ensure that active duty military 
do not command police units.  In all newly democratic countries, even those where the 
police is already under civilian control, police training and staffing must be adapted to the 
requirements of operating in a democratic environment.  Personnel must be trained to 
respect civil liberties and force levels must be increased to match the higher crime rates 
that often accompany democratization (as curfews are lifted, borders are opened, and 
former combatants in post-conflict democracies turn to illegal activities).34   
  
Training in the use of non-lethal force, legal procedures, and the principles of 
community-based policing distinguish the police in new democracies from the military, 
whose training in the maximum use of force to eliminate the enemy is incompatible with 
internal policing.  Police training should correct basic deficiencies in crime prevention 
skills and standard detective work that emerged as a result of reliance on informants and 
                                                
34 For an overview of the issues involved in the civilianization of the police, see Murray Scot Tanner, “Will 
the State Bring You Back In?  Policing and Democratization,” Comparative Politics, 33:1 (October 2000).  
For a discussion of reform in a specific case, see William Stanley and Charles T. Call, “Building a New 
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coerced confessions during the authoritarian period.   In the first stage of 
democratization, military-style ranks are frequently replaced with a British-style police 
hierarchy or civil service-type personnel grades (e.g., Germany, Indonesia) as a symbolic 
demonstration of the civilianization of the police.    
 
One of the most problematic aspects of police reform is increasing force strength 
to meet threat levels.  In Indonesia, for example, the police was moved out of the MOD 
with the transition to democracy, but it is estimated that it will take at least 10-15 years 
for the police to increase their personnel levels enough to be able to maintain order on 
their own.  The need for more police, combined with the pressure to downsize the 
military in many new democracies, frequently leads to former military personnel flooding 
the ranks of the police force.  This endangers the process of demilitarization of public 
security.  To counter this, legislation should limit the number of ex-military permitted 
and enforce strict training requirements for all new personnel. 
 
In addition to demilitarizing the police, civilian leaders must get the military out 
of the domestic intelligence business and assert civilian control over the military’s 
legitimate intelligence functions.  The first step of democratic reformers is usually to 
establish a clear division of labor – limiting the military to collecting military 
intelligence, and perhaps foreign intelligence.  Civilians should be responsible for 
strategic intelligence and counterintelligence and should be guided by rules of evidence 
and domestic laws.  In Mozambique, for example, the National Defense Law of 1997 
                                                                                                                                            
Civilian Police Force in El Salvador,” in Krishna Kumar, ed., Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical 
Roles for International Assistance (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).   
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limits the intelligence services of the armed forces to collecting information of a military 
character.  Similarly, in South Korea, the military’s Defense Security Command, a key 
domestic intelligence agency in the 1980s, was stripped of power unrelated to military 
affairs after Kim Young’s victory in the 1993 presidential elections.  The Guatemalan 
government is proceeding slowly on its commitment in the 1996 peace accords to create a 
Civilian Intelligence Agency within the Ministry of Interior to handle internal 
intelligence.  The 1999 law that created the new Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) 
does not clearly define a division of labor between civilian and military intelligence 
agencies, failing to even mention the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the 
state military police or the armed forces.35 
 
To ensure that the new division of labor is respected, mechanisms for civilian 
oversight of military intelligence agencies must be put into place.  Civilians should 
ensure that old counterintelligence records are not kept by the military and that the 
military does not create or maintain parallel counterintelligence structures.  Civilian 
oversight of military intelligence can take a number of different forms.  Perhaps most 
common is the creation of an overarching civilian agency to oversee the assortment of 
military and civilian agencies that conduct intelligence.  The civilian intelligence agency, 
in turn, should be accountable to the executive and the legislature.  If the central 
intelligence agency is to exercise effective civilian oversight of military intelligence, 
civilians must staff it and military intelligence agencies must be required to report to it.  
In Brazil, despite multiple efforts to create centralized intelligence agencies, military 
                                                
35 Marco Cepik, “The New Brazilian Intelligence System: An Institutional Assessment,” paper presented at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2000. 
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intelligence agencies continue to be involved in domestic intelligence (in particular, 
collecting information on the Landless Movement) and are subject to little civilian 
oversight.36   
 
Civilians sometimes choose to assert control over military intelligence agencies 
by having them report directly to the president or to the minister of defense, rather than a 
central intelligence agency.  In cases where there is a history of the president using 
intelligence agencies for political purposes, a reformer might choose to have military 
agencies report to the ministry of defense (as South Korean President Kim Young did 
with the military’s Defense Security Command).  In contrast, in countries where civilians 
feel their tenuous control over the ministry of defense endangers their supervision of 
military intelligence, the latter might be required to report directly to the president.  This 
was the case in Spain in 1984 when legislation designated the military’s Higher Defense 
Intelligence Center (CESID) as the intelligence agency of the prime minister and required 
it to report to the executive and to parliament (even though it still depended organically 
on the MOD).37   
 
Conclusion 
The writing of constitutions and laws is not sufficient to guarantee military 
respect for civil liberties and accountability to democratically elected leaders.  However, 
it is a necessary first step.   The legal framework must both be clear and its provisions 
                                                
36 Ibid.  See also Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers  (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 63-64 and 66-68.   
37 Jorge Zaverucha, “The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and 
Brazilian Transitions,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 25 (1993), pp. 286-287. 
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widely understood by civilians and military alike for it to have any impact on behavior.  
Although some military and civilian actors may reject the framework, it increases the cost 
of defying democratic authority and provides leverage to civilians trying to assert their 
control.    
